Paper Title Number 1
Published in Journal 1, 2009 (Full Paper | Your Name, You. (2009). "Paper Title Number 1." Journal 1. 1(1).)
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Evict+Skip: A High-Bandwidth, Non-Shared-Page Cache Covert Channel Attack
Streamline, a paper published in ASPLOS 2021, introduced an asynchronous framework to construct high-bandwidth covert-channels. However, it required that the sender and the receiver had to share the virtual memory, which made it less general. In order to figure this out, we proposed a brand new high-bandwidth covert-channel, which leveraged the directory conflicts of non-inclusive machine and the universal feature of Prime+Probe Attack.
publications
GoFetch: Breaking Constant-Time Cryptographic Implementations Using Data Memory-Dependent Prefetchers
Boru Chen, Yingchen Wang, Pradyumna Shome, Christopher W. Fletcher, David Kohlbrenner, Riccardo Paccagnella, Daniel GenkinPublished in USENIX Security, 2024 (Full Paper | bibtex)
Pwnie Award -- Best Cryptographic Attack
GoFetch is a microarchitectural side-channel attack that can extract secret keys from constant-time cryptographic implementations via data memory-dependent prefetchers (DMPs). We show that DMPs are present in many Apple CPUs and pose a real threat to multiple cryptographic implementations, allowing us to extract keys from OpenSSL Diffie-Hellman, Go RSA, as well as CRYSTALS Kyber and Dilithium.
Peek-a-Walk: Leaking Secrets via Page Walk Side Channels
Alan Wang, Boru Chen, Yingchen Wang, Christopher W. Fletcher, Daniel Genkin, David Kohlbrenner, Riccardo PaccagnellaPublished in IEEE S&P (Oakland), 2025 (Full Paper | bibtex)
Peek-a-Walk is a microarchitectural side-channel attack that leaks secrets from the page walk process. This amplifies an attacker’s bit leakage capabilities (up to 42 of the 64 secret bits) in scenarios where secrets are dereferenced microarchitecturally.